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Since late 1995, Venezuelan President Rafael Caldera has faced mounting protests against the
government's economic policies, which are largely being pushed by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). In addition to demonstrations and strikes by labor and grassroots groups, the
administration is also confronting an increasingly hostile Congress, which is divided over the
government's erratic economic policies. Caldera, who served as president from 1969-1973,
was elected again in December 1993 for a five-year term. When he first took office, he enjoyed
widespread popularity after his predecessor, Carlos Andres Perez (1974-1979 and 1989-1993), was
forced out of government on charges of corruption. However, almost immediately Caldera was
hit by the most serious financial crisis in Venezuela's history. Sixteen banks which held 60% of
Venezuela's financial assets failed, prompting massive government-funded bailouts (see NotiSur,
02/04/94).
During his two years in office, Caldera's hesitation to impose much-needed economic reforms,
coupled with three consecutive years of recession, have helped make Venezuela one of the worst
performing economies in Latin America. In 1992, the GDP had grown by a healthy rate of 5.8%. But
in 1993 as former president Perez was forced from office and the country elected a new government
the economy slipped into recession, with a 0.2% drop in GDP that year. In 1994, the economy
plunged by another 2.9%. Last year, the GDP did rebound somewhat with a 2% growth rate, but that
was largely fueled by the positive performance in the petroleum sector rather than by government
efforts to stimulate the economy. Open unemployment now stands at about 12% of the economically
active population (EAP), and half of those who do work are employed in the informal sector.
According to the Central University, 73% of Venezuela's 22 million population now lives in poverty,
with 40% considered extremely poor.
One of the central reasons for the country's dismal economic performance is the government's
inability to impose needed fiscal and monetary discipline. In 1994, the fiscal deficit reached a
whopping 6.5% of GDP. And, despite some government austerity last year, in 1995 the deficit fell
only slightly, to 6% of GDP. Not surprisingly, the consumer price index (CPI) has teetered on the
brink of hyperinflation. In 1994, annual inflation climbed to 70.9%. It dropped slightly to 56.7% in
1995, but this year it is expected to surpass 100%. Foreign investment in the country has plummeted,
with a decrease of 40% in the rate of investment in 1995. Capital flight has also increased. By the end
of 1995, the level of currency reserves dropped well below minimum operative levels. At year-end,
the Central Bank reported US$9 billion in total reserves and US$5 billion in liquid reserves, a US$2
billion decrease compared with December 1994 and about US$1 billion below the minimum level
recommended by most economists.
Much of the current economic problems have been caused by Caldera's efforts to avoid the kinds
of neoliberal reform carried out by nearly all his counterparts throughout Latin America. In 1994
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and 1995, for example, Caldera attempted to control inflation through state price controls and a
government freeze on the exchange rate. But given the failure of such measures to stunt inflation or
promote growth, Caldera has been forced to reconsider his economic program. In early December,
Finance Minister Luis Raul Matos Azocar announced a huge 70% devaluation of local currency. The
new rate was set at 290 bolivares per US$1.00, changing a 17-month government policy that had
frozen the exchange rate at 170 bolivares per US$1.00. The devaluation was aimed at paving the way
for opening negotiations with the IMF. "We are creating the conditions to begin the process with the
IMF," Matos said.
According to Matos, the government had drawn up a new economic plan called "Agenda
Venezuela," which would lay the basis for negotiations with the IMF. The government wants fresh
IMF funds to help it meet servicing obligations on the nation's mounting foreign debt. Under
"Agenda Venezuela," the government proposes a gradual reduction of the fiscal deficit, primarily by
increasing revenue from taxes and reducing public spending. Among other things, the government
also proposes to remove exchange rate controls and raise interest rates. All these measures are
required by the IMF. Of the IMF conditions, however, the most difficult for the government to
implement is an increase in gasoline prices. In Venezuela, gasoline prices are among the lowest in
the world because of government subsidies, and the government has largely maintained that policy
because it fears that any increase in fuel prices will trigger a social explosion.
Indeed, when former president Perez signed an IMF agreement that included gasoline price hikes, it
led to massive riots in February 1989 in which at least 300 people were killed (see NotiSur , 03/07/89).
Perez was forced to suspend the IMF agreement in 1992 following two failed coup attempts against
his government. Nevertheless, Caldera now seems resigned to raise gasoline prices given his
government's decision to negotiate with the IMF. In October, for example, the government increased
prices by 80% to US$0.054 per liter, although that hike was wiped out by the December devaluation,
which pushed the price back down to the equivalent of US$0.03. Meanwhile, the IMF negotiations
have dragged on. In February, Caldera assigned a new team to negotiate with the IMF headed by
socialist Teodoro Petkoff and Luis Giusti, president of the state-owned oil company Petroleos de
Venezuela (PDVSA).
But the negotiations are progressing extremely slowly, despite the government's commitment to
reach an accord with the Fund. The slow progress reflects the Caldera administration's concern
about the effects of austerity on lower-income groups. Indeed, in January and February food prices
soared by up to 85% as a result of the December devaluation. The heavy jump in the CPI in the
first two months comes on top of a 177% accumulated inflation rate for 1994 and 1995. The spiraling
food prices in January and February, combined with an increase in bus fares, set off repeated street
demonstrations against government policies, which resulted in frequent clashes with police. The
unrest has forced the government to take steps to offset the effects of austerity on the poor. In
February, the government raised the minimum monthly salary by 45% to US$155.
In addition, the government announced a new system of subsidies for more than half of the
country's 21 million people. Three million families, comprising 12 million people, will now receive a
government payment of US$9.66 per month, according to Planning Minister Edgar Paredes Pisani.
The "family subsidy" will replace a previous system of government food stamps for milk, rice, and
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flour. Pisani has also announced that the government will distribute some medicines at 20% of cost.
Nevertheless, the government is between a rock and a hard place, since austerity measures to lower
the fiscal deficit are urgent and unavoidable. As a result, Caldera insists that despite the measures
to offset austerity, his government will not be swayed from the path of reform. "I'm prepared to take
the measures that the situation in Venezuela demands," said Caldera in a speech in early March.
"No pill is too bitter for me to swallow in the service of my country. We have to save the nation." In
his speech, the president said he is preparing to raise domestic gasoline prices to about US$0.13 per
liter.
In addition, Caldera announced that controls on the exchange rate will be lifted, privatizations
accelerated, and the fiscal deficit aggressively reduced. In general, Caldera's speech drew cautious
approval from opposition politicians and the business community. "There are some signs of good
intentions and measures that we hope will be taken very soon to reduce the uncertainty that is
doing great harm to the country," said Chamber of Deputies president Ramon Guillmero Aveledo,
a member of the opposition Comite de Organizacion Politica Independiente (COPEI). "It's positive
that the president realizes the government cannot continue to maintain gasoline prices at current
levels," said Jorge Serrano, president of Venezuela's largest business chamber, Fedecamaras.
However, the announced measures have also been criticized for their "ambiguity," since many
business and political leaders accuse the government of drawing up erratic and vague policies that
need to be pulled together into a concrete plan of action. Still, Caldera's decision to negotiate with
the IMF represents a sharp turn to the right in his administration. During his campaign, for example,
Caldera criticized "the social insensibility of IMF technicians," and he promised that the price of
gasoline would only go up when the population was in better condition to pay a higher price, which
is certainly not the case at the moment. In response, protests by labor and grassroots organizations
are growing around the country. In early March, two work stoppages took place involving 850,000
public employees.
In addition to the strikes, workers held massive protest marches in Caracas and six other cities,
leading to violence in some places, such as Maracaibo. And, in Barquisimeto, nonstop student
demonstrations have pushed the government to threaten to militarize the university. On March 21,
Caracas's famous "cacerolazos" citizens that march through the streets banging pots and pans to
protest the deteriorating social and economic conditions began again, the first time since 1992. "The
people are hungry," said Bishop Roberto Lucker of the Bishops' Conference (Conferencia Episcopal
de Venezuela, CEV). "They are in anguish, with their backs to the wall, and this increasingly forces
the poor to demand justice." Business leaders and political analysts agree with the Catholic Church
that the high levels of unemployment and the increasing poverty are a powder keg just waiting for
a spark. Government officials have suggested that they might be forced to "militarize" the country's
principal cities to avoid further social explosions.
Meanwhile, greatly complicating the situation, Caldera has run into unexpected problems in the
legislature. Until now, congressional power under the Caldera administration has been split four
ways among the governing Convergencia- Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) alliance, the social
democrats (Accion Democratica, AD), the Christian democrat COPEI, and the Causa Radical
(Causa R) workers' party. However, in early March, in a surprising realignment of forces as the
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regular session of Congress began, MAS joined with COPEI and Causa R to marginalize the AD
and Caldera's Convergencia, allowing the opposition to gain control of Congress. Traditionally in
Venezuela, the president of Congress is a member of the governing party, since, according to the
Constitution, that person replaces the president in case of resignation, impeachment, incapacity, or
death. Breaking that tradition, however, MAS senator Fernandez Dalo was elected speaker of the
Senate and, as such, automatically became president of Congress.
The realignment of legislative forces reflects the growing opposition to the Caldera administration's
apparent economic incompetence. "Faced with the inability of the administration to resolve the
economic and social crises, Congress has to force the executive to put things back on track,"
explained Causa R secretary general Pablo Medina. In fact, on March 23 the newly configured
Congress pulled the rug out from under IMF negotiations by refusing to approve Caldera's
proposed 1996 budget. The Finance Commission of the Chamber of Deputies, which is dominated
by opposition politicians, rejected the budget proposal that was supposed to go into effect on
April 1. If the full lower house supports the rejection of the budget, the government will have to
repeat the 1995 budget, which would block funding for new programs. It would also jeopardize
the government's ability to respond to the demands for wage hikes by more than 1 million state
employees, of which 150,000 are teachers already on strike and another 700,000 are public employees
who have been carrying out constant work stoppages and protest marches.
"The decision was made because of the government's irresponsibility in not having presented
a realistic budget in a timely manner," said COPEI deputy Gustavo Tarre, president of the
commission and considered an economic "hard-liner." Congress has also threatened to oust Finance
Minister Matos, which would leave Caldera without his key economic advisor just when he has
finally shown signs of taking the economic helm. "Now, when there is finally a willingness to make
needed economic adjustments, Congress has refused to get on board," said an official involved in
the IMF negotiations.
Finally, in addition to the problems in Congress, the Caldera administration is also going through
a major internal crisis in the executive cabinet. In mid-March, Interior Minister Ramon Escovar
Salom resigned, followed on March 13 by the resignation of the rest of the cabinet to allow Caldera
to assemble a new team. Analysts speculated that Escovar Salom has his eye on a presidential bid
in the 1998 elections, and for that reason decided to resign. Among the mew cabinet appointments,
Teodoro Petkoff the socialist who is heading negotiations with the IMF has been named Planning
Minister, the second most important economic post in the Venezuelan government. In an indication
of Caldera's problems maintaining a coherent economic team, Petkoff is the fifth planning minister
since the president took office in 1994. (Sources: Notimex, 03/04/96; Deutsche Press Agentur,
03/13/96; Reuter, 12/11/95, 01/01/96, 01/05/96, 01/17/96, 01/23/96, 02/04/96, 02/27/96, 03/01/96,
03/02/96, 03/04/96, 03/12/96, 03/14/96; Inter Press Service, 12/09/95, 12/22/95, 01/09/96, 01/31/96,
02/24/96, 03/02/96, 03/23/96, 03/26/96; Agence France-Presse, 12/11/95, 12/27/95, 01/23/96, 02/06/96,
02/08/96, 02/27/96, 03/04/96, 03/11/96, 03/12/96, 03/15/96, 03/21/96, 03/27/96)
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